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Abstract
Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in particular has become a standard model for studying cooperation and
cheating, with cooperation often emerging as a robust outcome in evolving populations [1–8]. Here we
extend evolutionary game theory by allowing players’ strategies as well as their payoffs to evolve in
response to selection on heritable mutations. In nature, many organisms engage in mutually beneficial
interactions [2, 9–14], and individuals may seek to change the ratio of risk to reward for cooperation by
altering the resources they commit to cooperative interactions. To study this, we construct a general
framework for the co-evolution of strategies and payoffs in arbitrary iterated games. We show that, as
payoffs evolve, a trade-off between the benefits and costs of cooperation precipitates a dramatic loss of
cooperation under the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma; and eventually to evolution away from the Prisoner’s
Dilemma altogether. The collapse of cooperation is so extreme that the average payoff in a population may
decline, even as the potential payoff for mutual cooperation increases. Our work offers a new perspective
on the Prisoner’s Dilemma and its predictions for cooperation in natural populations; and it provides a
general framework to understand the co-evolution of strategies and payoffs in iterated interactions.
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Iterated games provide a framework for studying social interactions [1–3, 5–8], allowing researchers
to address pervasive biological problems such as the evolution of cooperation and cheating [2, 9–14].
Simple examples such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games [15–18] showcase a startling array
of counter-intuitive social behaviors, especially when studied in a population replicating under natural
selection [1, 18–23]. Despite the subject’s long history, a systematic treatment of all robust evolutionary
outcomes for even the simple Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma has only recently emerged [4, 19,22–24].
In an iterated two-player game, players X and Y face off in an infinite number of successive “rounds”.
In each round the players simultaneously choose their plays and receive associated payoffs. We study
games with a 2 × 2 payoff matrix, so that the players have two choices in each round. We label these
choices “cooperate” (c) and “defect” (d), using the traditional language for the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The
four corresponding payoffs for player X are Rx = (Rx(cc), Rx(cd), Rx(dc), Rx(dd)), where X’s play is de-
noted first. X may choose her play in each round depending on the outcomes of all previous rounds [25,26].
However, Press & Dyson [22] have shown that a memory-1 player, whose choice depends only on the pre-
vious round, can treat all opponents as though they also have memory-1. We therefore assume all players
have memory-1 without loss of generality (see SI). The strategy of such a a player is described by the prob-
abilities of cooperation given the four possible outcomes of the previous round: p = (pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd).
The longterm average payoff to player X facing opponent Y , sxy, can be calculated directly from her
strategy px, her opponent’s strategy py, and her payoffs Rx. In the context of evolutionary game theory
these payoffs contribute to the player’s fitness, which determines her expected reproductive success in an
evolving population (Figure 1).
The strategies that succeed in evolving populations can be understood in terms of evolutionary robust-
ness [19,23]. A strategy is evolutionary robust if, when resident in a population, no new mutant strategy
is favored to spread by natural selection. Evolutionary robustness is a weaker condition than that of an
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) [18, 27] (see SI). Robustness is a useful notion because there is rarely
if ever a single ESS, as many strategies px 6= py are neutrally equivalent and can invade each other by
genetic drift. And so we focus on evolutionary robust strategies, which are neutral to one another but
resist invasion by any strategy outside of the set. Indeed, the evolutionary robust strategies that coop-
erate amongst themselves are already known to dominate in evolving populations playing the Iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma with standard payoffs [19,23].
How does cooperation fare when both strategies and payoffs evolve in a population? Here we expand
the traditional purview of evolutionary game theory by allowing heritable mutations to a players payoffs,
as well as to their strategies, so that the composition of payoffs and strategies in a population co-evolve
over time. We first consider evolution in the donation game, a form of Prisoner’s Dilemma [4,23] in which
a player extracts a benefit B if her opponent cooperates and must pay a cost C if she cooperates, resulting
in payoffs R(cc) = B − C, R(cd) = −C, R(dc) = B, and R(dd) = 0. Each player has an incentive to
defect, although the players would receive a greater total payoff for mutual cooperation. It is natural to
assume a trade-off so that mutations that increase the benefit of cooperation, B, will also increase the
cost of cooperation, C. We therefore enforce the linear relation B = γC + k, and initially assume γ > 1.
Starting from standard payoffs cooperation will quickly rise to high frequency in populations when
only strategies evolve (Figure 2a), as previously predicted [16, 23]. But when both strategies and payoffs
co-evolve there is a striking reversal of fortunes. Evolution favors increasing the benefits and costs of
cooperation (Figure 2b), making the Prisoner’s Dilemma increasingly more acute over time. This evolution
of the payoff matrix is accompanied by a dramatic collapse of cooperation, so that the population is
eventually dominated by defection (Figure 2a). Paradoxically, defection comes to dominate even as the
payoffs available for mutual cooperation continually increase (Figure 2b). Moreover, this collapse of
cooperation is often accompanied by an erosion of mean population fitness (Figure 2c).
There is a simple intuition for this disheartening evolutionary outcome: initially, the population is
typically composed of self-cooperating strategies and so mutations that increase the reward for mutual
cooperation, B − C, are favored. But such mutations also increase the ratio B/(B − C), which is the
temptation to defect, to such a point that defection eventually out-competes cooperation.
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Selection
Population size N
ResidentMutant
c d
c R*(cc) R*(cd)
d R*(dc) R*(dd)
p*=(p* , p* , p* , p* )
c d
c R(cc) R(cd)
d R(dc) R(dd)
p=(pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd)cc cd dc dd
Figure 1: Evolving the rules of the game. We model evolution in a population of N players who face each other in
iterated, two-player games. Each individual has a “genotype” consisting of a strategy, p, and a payoff matrix, R.
The payoffs received by a pair of players X and Y depends on both players’ strategies and payoff matrices. Mutations
are introduced that change either a player’s strategy or her payoff matrix. Mutant strategies are drawn uniformly
from the four-dimensional space of memory-1 strategies. Mutant payoff matrices are chosen according to a particular
mutation scheme of interest. Natural selection and genetic drift occur according to a “copying” process [26], in
which two players, X and Y , are selected at random from the population, and Y adopts the genotype of X with
probability fy→x = 1/(1+exp[σ(sy−sx)]), where sx and sy are the payoffs the players receive in match-ups against
the entire population, and σ is the strength of selection. Given a new mutant X introduced into a population with
resident strategy Y , X replaces Y with probability [26] ρ =
(∑N−1
i=0
∏i
j=1 e
σ[(j−1)syy+(N−j)syx−jsxy−(N−j−1)sxx]
)−1
.
We can understand the collapse of cooperation, and the co-evolution of strategies and payoffs more
generally, by determining which strategies are evolutionary robust and how robustness varies as payoffs
evolve. To do so, we have analytically characterized all evolutionary robust memory-1 strategies for
arbitrary 2× 2 two-player iterated games (Figure 3, and SI). In particular, we have proven the following
necessary condition: a robust memory-1 strategy must be one of three types: self-cooperate, self-defect,
or self-alternate. Self-cooperative strategies C cooperate at equilibrium against an opponent using the
same strategy, meaning pcc = 1. Conversely, self-defecting strategies D satisfy pdd = 0. Self-alternating
strategies A alternate between cooperation and defection in subsequent rounds, meaning pcd = 0 and
pdc = 1. Monte-Carlo simulations on the full space of memory-1 strategies confirm that populations
adopt one of these three types > 97% of the time, reflecting the fact that all robust strategies fall within
these three types. However, the robust strategies are strict subsets of these types and, crucially, the volume
of robust strategies within each type depends on the payoffs of the game (Figure 3). The robust volumes
within these types can be computed analytically (see SI) and they determine whether a population tends
to adopt self-cooperation, self-defection, or self-alternation (Figure 2a,b).
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Figure 2: The collapse of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. We simulated populations playing the iterated
donation game, proposing mutant strategies until reaching equilibrium, and then also proposing mutant payoffs, both
at rate µ/2. Mutations to strategies were drawn uniformly from the full space of memory-1 strategies. Mutations
to payoffs were drawn so that increasing benefits of cooperation incur increasing costs: mutations perturbing the
benefit B by ∆ were drawn uniformly from the range ∆ ∈ [−0.1, 0.1], with the corresponding change to cost C
chosen to enforce the relationship B = γC + k. Evolution was modelled according to an imitation process under
weak mutation [4,23,26]. (a) Cooperative strategies are initially robust and dominate the population, but they are
quickly replaced by defectors as payoffs evolve. Dots indicate the proportion of 105 replicate simulated populations,
at each time point, within distance δ = 0.01 of the three strategy types self-cooperate, self-defect, and self-alternate.
Lines indicate analytic predictions for the frequencies of these strategy types, which depend upon the corresponding
volumes of robust strategies (see SI). (b) As payoffs evolve, the Prisoner’s Dilemma becomes more acute, with both
greater costs C and benefits B of cooperation. Cooperation collapses even though the payoff for mutual cooperation,
B − C, increases over time. (c) The mean population fitness (payoff) often declines over time, depending on the
choice of parameter γ. Populations of size N = 100 were initiated with B = 3 and C = 1 (which determines k),
and they evolved under selection strength σ = 1 (strong selection), with γ = 1.25 in panels a,b.
For the donation game illustrated in Figure 2, for example, the evolutionary robust strategies satisfy
Cr =
{
(pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd)|pcc = 1, pdc < B
C
(1− pcd), pdd <
(
B
C
− 1
)
(1− pcd)
}
,
Dr =
{
(pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd)|pdd = 0, pcc < 1−
(
B
C
− 1
)
pdc, pcd < 1− B
C
pdc
}
,
Ar =
{
(pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd)|pcd = 0, pdc = 1, pcc < 2 C
B + C
, pdd <
B − C
B + C
}
,
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for self-cooperating, self-defecting, and self-alternating strategies respectively. According to these equa-
tions, as the ratio B/C decreases – that is, as the Prisoner’s Dilemma becomes more acute – the volume
of the robust self-cooperating strategies decreases whereas the volume of robust self-defecting strategies
grows. Thus it is the ratio of benefit to cost that matters for the prospects of cooperation in the Iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma, as payoffs and strategies co-evolve.
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Figure 3: Evolutionary robust strategies in iterated two-player games. For an arbitrary 2 × 2 payoff matrix,
an evolutionary robust memory-1 strategy must be one of three possible types: those that cooperate against an
opponent who cooperates (left, pcc = 1), those that defect against an opponent who defects (center, pdd = 0), and
those that alternate between cooperate and defect against an alternating opponent (right, pcd = 0 and pdc = 1).
Within each of these strategy types, the strict subsets that are evolutionary robust can be determined analytically
from the payoff matrix, as indicated on the figure (see SI for full derivations). The regions of robust self-cooperating
and robust self-defecting strategies are three-dimensional, whereas the robust self-alternating strategies are two-
dimensional. Monte Carlo simulations exploring the full space of memory-1 strategies confirm that these are the
only evolutionary robust solutions (Fig. S1). As payoffs evolve in a population, the volumes of robust strategies
change according to the equations in the figure, and they determine the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation and
defection (Fig. 2).
Enforcing the payoff structure of the donation game restricts the population to a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
However, our analysis applies to arbitrary 2 × 2 games and mutation schemes, and so it can permit
evolution between qualitatively different types of games. To explore this possibility, we considered a
natural generalization of the payoffs above by introducing another class of mutations that enable a “sucker”
to recover some portion α of her lost benefit, resulting in the payoff scheme: R(cc) = B − C, R(cd) =
−C + αB, R(dc) = B, and R(dd) = 0. As before, we allow the payoffs B and C to evolve together by
enforcing a linear relationship, and we additionally allow α ∈ [0, 1] to evolve independently. This mutation
scheme can produce any possible 2 × 2 game. In particular, when α < C/B the payoffs correspond to a
Prisoner’s Dilemma, whereas when α > C/B the payoffs encode a Snowdrift game [15–18].
Figure 4 shows the emergence of a qualitatively new game in a population initialized at the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. As payoffs and strategies co-evolve, the benefits and costs of cooperation initially increase,
resulting again in the collapse of cooperation (Figure 4a). But this collapse is quickly followed by an
increase in α as the few remaining “suckers” seek to recover payoffs lost to defecting opponents. Eventually
the Snowdrift game emerges (Figure 4b), and the population is thereafter dominated by alternating
strategies (Figure 4a). The instability of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in favor of the Iterated Snowdrift
5
game is striking: α achieves its maximum value and the payoffs B and C continually increase, producing
increasingly acute versions of the Snowdrift game.
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Figure 4: Evolution from Prisoner’s Dilemma to the Snowdrift game. We simulated a population under weak
mutation, proposing mutant strategies drawn uniformly from the full space of memory-1 IPD strategies. Aside
from mutations to payoffs B and C, as in Fig. 2, we also independently allowed mutations to α ∈ [0, 1], so that
“suckers” can recover a portion α of the benefit lost to a defecting opponent: R(cd) = −C + αB. (a) Evolution
produces a rapid loss of cooperation and increase in defecting strategies, as in Fig. 2, now followed by an increase
in alternating strategies. Points indicate the proportion of simulated populations within a distance δ = 0.01 of
the three strategy types; lines indicate analytic predictions (see SI). (b) Following the collapse of cooperation,
the Prisoner’s Dilemma (shaded region) is replaced by the Snowdrift game (unshaded region), with α > C/B.
Parameters values as in Fig. 2a-b. Populations of size N = 100 were initiated with B = 3 and C = 1, and evolved
under selection strength σ = 1 (strong selection), with γ = 1.25
We have assumed that payoff mutations are “private”, meaning that the player who receives a payoff
mutation unilaterally receives the increase or decrease in benefit and cost. However our results are largely
unchanged if we assume instead that payoff mutations are “public”, such that a player sets her opponent’s
costs (Figure S5). The collapse of cooperation also occurs under weak selection (i.e. Nσ ∼ 1; see SI),
under local mutations to strategies (Figure S9), and also when mutations to payoffs are more rare than
mutations to strategies (Figure S8).
We have studied co-evolution of strategies and payoffs in a population of individuals reproducing
according to their finesses, which is the standard framework used in evolutionary biology, as opposed
to studying round-robin tournaments [1,2], one-shot games [15], payoff evolution without strategy evolu-
tion [28,29], or environmental “shocks” to the payoff matrix [30–32]. We have focused on payoff mutations
that enforce a trade-off, by simultaneously increasing the benefits and costs of cooperation. However, our
framework for analyzing payoff-strategy co-evolution, based on computing the evolutionary robustness of
strategy sets, can be applied to any mutation scheme and can produce a potentially vast array of evolu-
tionary outcomes. For example, if mutations increase the benefit B whilst leaving the cost C unchanged
then cooperation will remain stable in the population (Figure S3). Alternatively, when mutations are pri-
vate and 0 < γ < 1 (Figure S4), so that costs increase faster than benefits, or when mutations are public
and players can set their opponent’s benefits (Figure S6), then populations evolve towards an increasing
frequency of self-cooperative strategies despite decreased rewards for cooperation (Figure S6).
What types of payoff mutations can arise will depend upon the biological context. Examples of the
trade-off between costs and benefits that we have studied (Figures 2 and 3) are found in nature at many
scales [10, 11, 33], from human societies, where individuals modulate how frequently and how much they
punish free-riders [10, 34], to micro-organism, such as the marine bacteria Vibrionaceae [11]. In Vibri-
onaceae populations, for example, individuals cooperate in a public-goods game by sharing siderophores
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required for iron acquisition. Mutations that alter the siderophore biosynthetic pathway alter an individ-
ual’s strategy, by changing its contribution to the public good; mutations that improve the siderophore
transport pathway alter an individual’s payoffs, by imposing a greater metabolic cost along with an in-
creased benefit from the public good. In these Vibrionaceae populations, as well as many other biological
systems with opportunities for cooperative interactions [11, 33, 35–38], defectors are often found at high
frequency in nature, as our analysis predicts when mutations increase both the costs and benefits of
cooperation. A framework that allows strategies and payoffs to co-evolve in a population significantly ex-
pands the scope, and qualitatively alters the predictions, of evolutionary game theory applied to biological
systems.
Appendix
In this supplement we prove that only three types of memory-1 strategies – self-alternators, self-cooperators,
and self-defectors – can be evolutionary robust and prevalent in arbitrary iterated two-player games with
a 2× 2 payoff matrix. We derive analytic expressions for the subsets of these strategy types that are evo-
lutionary robust. We show that the volume of robust self-alternators, self-cooperators, and self-defectors
provide good approximations for the time spent by a population at each of these strategy types, for a
fixed payoff matrix. As shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 4 of the main text, this analysis enables us to explain
strategy evolution in iterated two-player games, even when payoff matrices are also allowed to evolve. In
particular, this analysis predicts the collapse of cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (Fig. 2),
as well as the transition from the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma to the Snowdrift game (Fig. 4).
We first define evolutionary robustness for an arbitrary iterated two-player game with a 2× 2 payoff
matrix in a well-mixed population of finite size N ; and we state necessary and sufficient conditions for
evolutionary robustness under the limits of either strong or weak selection. We then show that, under
strong selection, only three subsets of memory-1 strategies can be evolutionary robust and prevalent:
self-cooperate, self-defect and self-alternate. Within each of these three strategy types we derive the
precise subset that is robust, and from this we calculate the volume of robust strategies of each type.
Under weak selection, by contrast, we show that only the self-cooperate and self-alternate strategies can
be evolutionary robust.
Finally we perform simulations under weak mutation for a variety of payoff mutation schemes, in
addition to those used in the main text. These simulations demonstrate that the volume of robust
strategies within each of these types continues to determine the outcome of payoff-strategy co-evolution
in finite populations.
Iterated two-player games
We consider an iterated game with an infinite number of successive rounds between two players, X and
Y . We study games with a 2×2 payoff matrix, so that in each round each player has two choices, denoted
cooperate (c) or defect (d). The payoffs for the respective players are given in Table S1, in their most
general form.
Memory: In general, a player may have an arbitrarily long memory, such that her play in each
round depends on the plays in all previous rounds. However, as per Press and Dyson [22], a player with
memory-1 may treat all opponents as though they are also memory-1, regardless of the opponent’s actual
memory. And so the sets of scores sxx, sxy and syx for a player X with memory-1 facing an opponent Y
with arbitrary memory can be understood by considering the scores received by X against an arbitrary
memory-1 opponent instead. By contrast, the score a long-memory player Y received against himself, syy,
may depend on his memory capacity. Nonetheless, since our results for strong selection do not depend on
syy, we will show that a robust strategy for a memory-1 player X is robust against any opponent, regardless
of his memory capacity. The same is true under weak selection: under weak selection, the robustness of
a strategy may depend on syy, but nevertheless, as shown in [23] for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, we can still
derive conditions for robustness under weak selection that do not depend on the memory of Y .
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Table S1: Payoff matrix for an arbitrary 2× 2 game
Player Y
c d
Player X
c Rx(cc), Ry(cc) Rx(cd), Ry(dc)
d Rx(dc), Ry(cd) Rx(dd), Ry(dd)
It is in this sense that our results on the evolutionary robustness of memory-1 strategies are with-
out loss of generality – because such memory-1 strategies are evolutionary robust against all opponents,
regardless of the opponent’s memory capacity. However, our results do not exlucde the possibility that
there exist long-memory strategies that are also evolutionary robust.
Equilibrium payoffs in Iterated Games: The longterm scores received by two memory-1 players
in an iterated two-player game are calculated from the equilibrium rates of the different plays, (cc), (cd),
(dc) and (dd), given by the stationary vector v = (vcc, vcd, vdc, vdd) of the Markov matrix describing the
iterated game [19]. The equilibrium score of player X against player Y is calculated according to
sxy =
v ·Rx
v · I =
D (px,py,Rx)
D (px,qy, I)
(1)
where I = (1, 1, 1, 1), px and qy are the strategies of players X and Y , and Rx is the payoff matrix of
player X. The determinant D(px,qy, f) gives the dot product between the stationary vector v and an
arbitrary vector f = (fcc, fcd, fdc, fdd) [22], where
D(px,qy, f) = det

−1 + pccqcc −1 + pcc −1 + qcc fcc
pcdqdc −1 + pcd qdc fcd
pdcqcd pdc −1 + qcd fdc
pddqdd pdd qdd fdd
 . (2)
In general Eq. 1 is sufficient to calculate the scores received by a pair of memory-1 players. However,
there are certain pathological cases in which the Markov chain describing the iterated game has multiple
absorbing states. The scores in these cases can be calculated by assuming that players execute their
strategy with some small “error rate”  [25], so that the probability of cooperation is at most 1 −  and
at least . Assuming this, and taking the limit  → 0 then gives the player’s scores in the cases where
multiple absorbing states exist.
Alternate coordinate system: As shown in [19, 22, 23], manipulations of Eq. 1 produce an alter-
nate coordinate system for the four-dimensional space of memory-1 strategies, useful for analysing the
outcomes of iterated two-player games. In particular, we can convert from the basis (pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd) to
the basis (φ, χ, κ, λ) [19,22,23], where the two coordinate systems are related by
p˜x = φ [Ry − χRx − (1− χ)κI + λL] . (3)
Here p˜x = (−1 + pcc,−1 + pcd, pdc, pdd), I = (1, 1, 1, 1), and L = (0, 1, 1, 0). To convert directly between
the two coordinate systems we have the equations
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pcc = 1− φ (Ry(cc)− χRx(cc)− (1− χ)κ)
pcd = 1− φ (Ry(dc)− χRx(cd)− (1− χ)κ+ λ)
pdc = φ (χRx(dc)−Ry(cd) + (1− χ)κ− λ)
pdd = φ ((1− χ)κ−Ry(dd) + χRx(dd)) .
(4)
For completeness we have stated the coordinate transform above for the general case in which Rx 6= Ry.
Henceforth we will be concerned with monomorphic populations in which Rx = Ry = R. In this
coordinate scheme the players’ scores are related by [19,23]
syx − χsxy − (1− χ)κ+ λ(vcd + vdc) = 0. (5)
This relationship, which depends on the equilibrium rate of playing (cd) and (dc), can be used to deter-
mine analytic conditions for the evolutionary robust memory-1 strategies of an arbitrary 2× 2 game.
Useful inequalities: In addition to the relationship Eq. 5 we make note of four inequalities which
we will use to determine the memory-1 strategies that are evolutionary robust. We begin by noting that
the equilibrium payoff for X playing against an opponent Y is given by [19]
sxy = R(cc)vcc +R(cd)vcd +R(dc)vdc +R(dd)vdd (6)
(i) From Eq. 6, the difference between the two players’ scores can be written as
sxy − syx = (vdc − vcd)(Rdc −Rcd)
which gives
sxy − syx ≤ (vcd + vdc)|Rdc −Rcd| (7)
where equality is achieved by an opponent Y for whom vcd = 0 (e.g. an opponent who always cooperates).
(ii) Similarly, we must have
sxy − syx ≥ −(vdc + vcd)|Rdc −Rcd| (8)
where equality is achieved by an opponent Y for whom vdc = 0 (e.g. an opponent who never cooperates).
(iii) From Eq. 6, the sum of the two players’ scores is
sxy + syx = 2(vcc + (vdc + vcd))(R(cc)−R(dd))− (vdc + vcd)(2R(cc)− (R(cd) +R(dc))) + 2R(dd)
and, since vcc + (vdc + vcd) ≤ 1, we have
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sxy + syx ≤ 2R(cc)− (vdc + vcd)(2R(cc)− (R(cd) +R(dc))) (9)
where equality is achieved when vdd = 0 (e.g. by an opponent who never defects once they have been
defected against).
(iv) Finally, we also have
sxy + syx ≥ 2R(dd)− (vdc + vcd)(2R(dd)− (R(cd) +R(dc))) (10)
where equality is achieved when vcc = 0 (e.g. by an opponent who always defects once they have been
cooperated with).
Evolution in a population of players
We study evolution in a well-mixed, finite population of N haploid, memory-1 players. Evolution is
described by the “imitation” process of [26]. Under this model, which is similar to the Moran process,
pairs of individuals, X and Y , are drawn randomly from a population of size N at each time step. Player
X adopts the strategy of player Y with a probability (1 + exp [σ(sx − sy)])−1 that depends on their
respective total payoffs, sx and sy, summed across pairwise matchups with all players in the population.
Here σ denotes the strength of selection.
We study evolution in the limit of weak mutation. This means that, at any point in time, the
population is monomorphic for some payoff matrix R = (R(cc), R(cd), R(dc), R(dd)) and some strategy
p = (pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd). Given a population monomorphic for the resident type X, a mutation producing
type Y will fix with probability [26]
ρ(X,Y ) =
N−1∑
i=0
i∏
j=1
eσ[(j−1)syy+(N−j)syx−jsxy−(N−j−1)sxx]
−1 ,
or otherwise will be lost.
The “strong-selection” limit of this process is defined by taking N → ∞ while keeping σ fixed, so
that even small differences in payoffs convey a significant advantage to the player with the greater payoff.
Alternatively, the “weak-selection” limit arises by taking N →∞ while keeping the product Nσ ∼ 1 fixed,
in which case even deleterious strategies may reach high frequency through genetic drift. We consider
both of these regimes of selection in our analyses below.
Evolutionary robustness
We will use the above relations to determine which strategies are evolutionary robust in a population of
N players.
The concept of evolutionary robustness [23] is similar to the notion of evolutionary stability [18, 27].
An evolutionary stable strategy px is one that satisfies either sxx > syx, or else sxx = syx and sxy > syy,
for all opponents py 6= px [18,27]. This means that a strategy is evolutionary stable provided (i) it cannot
be selectively invaded by any other strategy (sxx > syx), or (ii) it can selectively invade (sxy > syy) any
strategy that can neutrally invade it (sxx = syx). However, as shown in [19, 23], evolutionary stable
strategies rarely exist within the full space of memory-1 strategies, because many strategies can neutrally
invade each other. Therefore, we analyze the outcomes of evolution in a population using the notion of
evolutionary robustness [23].
In general, a strategy is defined to be evolutionary robust if, when resident in a population, there
is no mutant that is favored to spread by natural selection when rare [23]. In particular, under strong
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selection a strategy X is evolutionary robust selection iff, when resident in a population of size N , it
cannot be selectively invaded by any mutant Y – that is, iff sxx ≥ sxy for all Y . The condition for
evolutionary robustness under strong selection is thus identical to that of a Nash equilibrium [19]. Under
weak selection, by contrast, a resident strategy X is evolutionary robust iff the fixation probability of
any new mutant Y satisfies ρyx ≤ 1/N (see [23]). As shown previously [19, 23], evolutionary robustness,
as opposed to evolutionary stability, is useful for characterizing the strategies that dominate in evolving
populations. In the remainder of the supplement we first derive results for evolutionary robustness under
strong selection, which are used in the main text. We then derive conditions for evolutionary robustness
under weak selection.
Necessary conditions for memory-1 strategies to be robust under strong selection
We start by proving that strategies in the interior of the four-dimensional memory-1 strategy space cannot
be evolutionary robust – that is, they can always be selectively invaded by some other strategy. In fact,
we will show that nothing on the interior can be robust with the exception of the “equalizers”, discussed
below.
Consider a resident strategy X characterised by (φx, χx, κx, λx) and a mutant strategy Y characterised
by (φy, χy, κy, λy). From Eq. 5, with y = x, we find that the payoff of the resident against itself is
sxx = κx − λx
1− χx (vcd + vdc).
Similarly, from Eq. 5 we find that the payoff of Y against X is
syx =
(1− χx)κx − λx(wcd + wdc) + χx((1− χy)κy − λy(wcd + wdc))
(1− χxχy)
where v is the stationary vector for X playing against itself and w is the stationary vector for X playing
against Y .
First suppose that X satisfies 0 ≤ pcc < 1 and 0 < pdd ≤ 1. Then suppose Y is chosen such that
χx = χy and φx = φy. We can then write
syx =
(1− χx)(κx + χxκy)− (λx + χxλy)(wcd + wdc)
(1− χ2x)
.
We also choose λy such that (1− χx)κx − λx = (1− χy)κy − λy i.e. so that pcd and pdc are unaltered by
the mutation. This gives
syx =
(κx + χxκy)
1 + χx
− λx
1− χx (wcd + wdc)−
χx(κy − κx)
(1 + χx)
(wcd + wdc)
We can then write
syx − sxx = χx(κy − κx)
1 + χx
[1− (wcd + wdc)] + λx
1− χx [(vcd + vdc)− (wcd + wdc)]
and so Y selectively invades X iff
χx(κy − κx)
1 + χx
[1− (wcd + wdc)] > λx
1− χx [(wcd + wdc)− (vcd + vdc)]
This inequality can always be satisfied unless vcd + vdc = 1, in which case both sides vanish and the
mutation is neutral. To see this, we use Eq. 2 to calculate
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vcd+vdc =
2(1− pcc)(1 + pcc − pdd)pdd
(1− pcc)((1− pcd − pdc)(1 + pcc) + 2pcdpdc) + 2(1− p2cc + pcdpdc)pdd − (1− 2pcc + pcd + pdc)p2dd
and assume that the mutant is such that κy = κx + η where η is small. We can then write
(wcd + wdc)− (vcd + vdc) =
(vcd + vdc)
η(1− (pcc + pdd))(1 + pcc − pdd)
2(1− pcc)(1 + pcc − pdd)pdd −
η(1− (pcc + pdd) + (pcc − pdd)(pcd + pdc − (pcc + pdd)))
2(1− pcc)(1 + pcc − pdd)pdd +O
(
η2
)
or, more conveniently
(wcd + wdc)− (vcd + vdc) = Aη
where A depends on the resident strategy and is finite (but can be zero). The condition for invasion of
X by Y then becomes
χx
1 + χx
[1− (vcd + vdc)] η > λx
1− χxAη
which can always be satisfied (since we can always invert the sign of η by decreasing κx instead of increasing
it). The only exception occurs when both sides of the inequality vanish, i.e. if wcd + wdc = vcd + vdc = 1,
and A = 0, or if χx = λx = 0 (we will deal will the latter case separately). Solving for vcd + vdc = 1 gives
solutions pcd = 1, pdc = 0 or pcd = 0, pdc = 1. Replacing these into the equation for wcd + wdc gives
A = 0. Therefore any strategy X with 0 < pcc < 1 and 0 < pdd < 1 can be selectively invaded unless
pcd = 1 and pdc = 0, or pcd = 0 and pdc = 1 – that is, unless X alternates.
In the boundary cases pcc = 0 or pdd = 1, φ takes a maximal value, and an increase in κ necessitates a
corresponding decrease in φ to ensure all probabilities are in the range [0, 1]. However, the same argument
holds as above, since small changes in κ and φ together precipitate a small change in vcd + vdc; so that
even in these boundary cases, X can be selectively invaded unless pcd = 1 and pdc = 0, or pcd = 0 and
pdc = 1 – that is, unless X alternates.
The self-alternating strategies discussed so far come in two forms. However, we can show that the
alternating strategies of the form pcd = 1 and pdc = 0 cannot be robust. It is easy to construct a mutant
that can selectively invade such strategies: if we assume, without loss of generality, that R(dc) > R(cd),
then an opponent with pdc = 0 and pcd < 1 scores R(dc) at equilibrium, whereas such an alternator scores
(1/2)(R(cd) + R(dc)) against itself. Therefore the mutant can selectively invade and this strategy type
cannot be robust. The only exception occurs in the special case R(cd) = R(dc), in which case both types
of alternators score identically. Henceforth we consider only alternators of the form pcd = 0 and pdc = 1,
because only these alternators have the potential to be evolutionary robust.
Now we consider the cases X that satisfy pcc = 1 or pdd = 0, that is the self-cooperators and self-
defectors. To address these cases, we can use the same procedure as above. We consider a mutant Y such
that κx = κy, χx = χy and φx = φy. This has the effect that pcc and pdd remain constant under mutation.
We then have
syx = κx − (λx + χxλy)(wcd + wdc)
(1− χ2x)
and Y can selectively invade iff
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λx [(vcd + vdc)− (wcd + wdc)] > χx [λy(wcd + wdc)− λx(vcd + vdc)]
As in the previous case, it is easy to show that a small change η in λx gives (wcd+wdc)− (vcd+ vdc) = Aη
where A depends on the resident strategy. We then have
−(1 + χx)Aηλx > ηχx(vcd + vdc)
Once again, this can always be satisfied by either increasing or decreasing λx. The only exception occurs if
both sides vanish so that the mutant is neutral, i.e. if wcd+wdc = vcd+vdc = 0 and A = 0, or λx = χx = 0
(called equalizers, see below). The former case occurs iff either (i) X is a self-cooperator with pcc = 1,
(ii) X is a self-defector with pdd = 0, or (iii) X satisfies pcc = 0 and pdd = 1. However the case pcc = 0
and pdd = 1 can be selectively invaded, as shown above, and it is therefore not robust.
Therefore, in total, we have proven that any evolutionary robust strategy for an arbitrary 2× 2 game
must be one of following four types:
• the self-cooperators C = {(pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd) |pcc = 1},
• the self-defectors D = {(pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd) |pdd = 0},
• the self-alternators A = {(pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd) |pcd = 0, pdc = 1},
• the equalizers E = {(φ, χ, κ, λ)|λ = χ = 0}.
Finally, any strategy that falls in the intersection of two types above (e.g. those satisfying both pcc = 1
and pdd = 0) cannot be robust. Such a “mixed-type” strategy X will receive a score sxx that is a linear
combination of the scores received by a “pure-type” strategy. However whichever pure-type strategy
receives the higher of the two scores against itself can invade such a “mixed-type” strategy. Nonetheless,
such “mixed-type” strategies spread neutrally in a population of robust strategies with which they share
an absorbing state.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for evolutionary robustness under strong selection
As discussed above, a memory-1 strategy that is evolutionary robust in an arbitrary 2 × 2 game must
belong to one of the four types: self-alternators, self-cooperators, self-defectors, or equilizers. We now
derive sufficient conditions for strategies of each of these types to be robust.
The self-cooperators: The self-cooperators C satisfy pcc = 1 and score sxx = R(cc) against them-
selves, which corresponds to κ = R(cc). In the context of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, these are
precisely the “Good” strategies of [19] and discussed it [23]. In order to invade a resident strategy X, a
mutant Y must have
syx > R(cc).
Combining this with Eq. 5, Eq. 9, and Eq. 10, and rearranging, we find that Y can selectively invade iff
−χ(R(cc)− (R(cd) +R(dc)) > λ
or
−χ(R(dc)−R(cd)) > λ.
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Converting back to our original coordinate system, this implies a self-cooperator X is robust iff:
pdc(R(dc)−R(cc)) < (R(cc)−R(cd))(1− pcd)
and
pdd(R(dc)−R(cc)) < (R(cc)−R(dd))(1− pcd). (11)
The evolutionary robust self-cooperating strategies are thus described by the set
Cr =
{
p | pcc = 1, pdc < R(cc)−R(cd)
R(dc)−R(cc)(1− pcd), pdd <
R(cc)−R(dd)
R(dc)−R(cc) (1− pcd)
}
.
These analytic expressions for the robust self-cooperating strategies are confirmed by Monte-Carlo simu-
lations (Fig. S1).
The self-defectors: The self-defectors D satisfy pdd = 0 and score sxx = R(dd) against themselves,
which corresponds to κ = R(dd). In order to invade, a mutant Y must therefore have
syx > R(dd).
using this, as well as Eq. 5, Eq. 7 and Eq. 9, we find that a strategy Y can invade iff
χ(R(dc)−R(cd)) < λ
or
χ(R(cd) +R(dd)− 2R(dd)) < λ
Converting back to our original coordinate system, this implies that a self-defector X is robust iff:
pdc(R(cc)−R(dd)) < (R(dd)−R(cd))(1− pcc)
and
pdc(R(dc)−R(dd)) < (R(dd)−R(cd))(1− pcd). (12)
The evolutionary robust self-defecting strategies are thus described by the set
Dr =
{
p | pdd = 0, pdc < R(dd)−R(cd)
R(cc)−R(dd) (1− pcc), pdc <
R(dd)−R(cd)
R(dc)−R(dd)(1− pcd)
}
.
These analytic expressions for the robust self-defecting strategies are confirmed by Monte-Carlo simula-
tions (Fig. S1).
The self-alternators: The self-alternators A satisfy pcd = 0 and pdc = 1. Using Eq. 4, and converting
to the alternate coordinate system, we have
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λ = (1− χ)
(
κ− R(cd) +R(dc)
2
)
for strategies of this type. From Eq. 5, a resident strategy X of this type has
sxx =
R(cd) +R(dc)
2
.
In order to selectively invade the resident, then, a mutant Y must satisfy
syx >
R(cd) +R(dc)
2
Combining this with Eq. 5, Eq. 9, and Eq. 10, and rearranging, we find that Y can selectively invade iff
(1 + χ)
(
R(cd) +R(dc)
2
− κ
)
< 2χ(R(cc)− κ)
or
(1 + χ)
(
R(cd) +R(dc)
2
− κ
)
< 2χ(R(dd)− κ)
Converting back to our original coordinate system, this implies an self-alternator X is robust iff:
pcc < 2
R(dc)−R(cc)
R(dc)−R(cd)
and
pdd <
R(dc) +R(cd)− 2R(dd)
R(dc)−R(cd) . (13)
The evolutionary robust self-alternating strategies are thus described by the set
Ar =
{
p | pcd = 0, pdc = 1, pcc < 2R(dc)−R(cc)
R(dc)−R(cd) , pdd <
R(dc) +R(cd)− 2R(dd)
R(dc)−R(cd)
}
.
These analytic expressions for the robust self-alternating strategies are confirmed by Monte-Carlo simu-
lations (Fig. S1).
Characteristics of evolutionary robust strategies: We have identified the robust subsets of self-
alternators, self-cooperators and self-defectors, Ar, Cr and Dr, which cannot be selectively invaded, under
strong selection. The inequalities Eqs. 11-13 defining these robust strategies in fact guarantee that any
invading strategy is selected against, unless it satisfies wcd + wdc = 1 in the case of self-alternators, or
wcd+wdc = 0 in the case of self-cooperators and self-defectors – in which case both sides of the inequality
vanish and the mutant invades neutrally. The mutant strategies that satisfy these conditions are precisely
those of the same type (self-alternator, self-cooperator or self-defector) as the resident. In other words,
the only strategies that can neutrally invade robust self-alternators are other self-alternating strategies;
and the only strategies that can neutrally invade robust self-cooperators are other self-cooperators; and
the only strategies that can neutrally invade robust self-defectors are other self-defectors.
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The Equalizers: Finally, we must deal with the case of the Equalizers [8], which have χ = λ = 0.
From Eq. 5, we see that such strategies satisfy syx = κ against any invader Y . Thus, a population of
Equalizers is neutral against all possible invaders. The equalizer strategies are thus evolutionary robust.
However, unlike the other sets of robust strategies (Cr, Dr, Ar), which resist replacement by any other
strategy type, equalizers never resist invasion, and so they tend to be quickly lost from a population
through neutral drift. Therefore we exclude them from our further discussion of robust strategies and,
indeed, we find that populations spend very little time (< 0.01%) at the equalizers.
Volume of a robust strategy type: We can use Eqs. 11-13 to calculate the volumes associated
with each robust strategy type. In the case of the self-alternators the volume of Ar is in fact a 2D surface
of area (
2
R(dc)−R(cc)
R(dc)−R(cd)
)
×
(
R(dc) +R(cd)− 2R(dd)
R(dc)−R(cd)
)
where, in addition, we must constrain the area so that only strategies within the unit square are included.
Similarly, Cr has cross-sections of area(
R(cc)−R(cd)
R(dc)−R(cc)(1− pcd)
)
×
(
R(cc)−R(dd)
R(dc)−R(cc) (1− pcd)
)
and its volume is calculated by integration, with the limits of integration chosen to include only strategies
lying within the unit cube. Finally, Dr has cross-sections of area(
1− R(cc)−R(dd)
R(dd)−R(cd)pdc
)
×
(
1− R(dc)−R(dd)
R(dd)−R(cd)pdc
)
and its volume is calculated by integrating across those strategies lying within the unit cube.
Time spent at different strategy types: We now use our results on the volumes of robust strate-
gies to approximate the time spent at the different strategy types – self-cooperators, self-defectors, and
self-alternators – for fixed payoffs under strong selection. To make this analytical approximation we will
assume that the population spends all of its time at these three strategy types, an approximation moti-
vated by the fact that these types contain all the evolutionary robust strategies (except for the equilizers,
which are quickly replaced through neutral drift). Indeed, Monte Carlo simulations confirm that popula-
tions spend > 97% of their time at self-alternators, self-cooperators or self-defectors, for values of payoffs
ranging across an order of magnitude.
To approximate the amount of time a population spends in C, D or A, we simply the evolution of
strategies in population as a three-state Markov chain (Fig. S2). We assume that the probability g of
entering a strategy type is given by the probability that a robust strategy of that type replaces a randomly
drawn memory-1 strategy. We assume that non-robust strategies can be neglected, because although they
may be able to invade, they can quickly be reinvaded.
In order to calculate the probability of enetering a strategy type under the “imitation” model of [26],
we use the probability that a new mutant Y fixes in a population otherwise comprised of a resident X:
ρ(px,qy) =
N−1∑
i=0
i∏
j=1
eσ[(j−1)syy+(N−j)syx−jsxy−(N−j−1)sxx]
−1
The probability of the population adopting a self-alternator strategy under in this three-state chain is
then
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ga = Zδ
2Va
∫
p∈[0,1]4
∫
q∈Ar
ρ(p,q)dpdq
where q is integrated over the set of robust self-alternating strategies, p is integrated over the full set of
memory-1 strategy, ρ(p,q) is the probability that a resident strategy p is replaced by a robust alternator
q, and VA is the two-dimensional area comprised by robust alternators. The term δ
2Va denotes the
volumes of all memory-1 strategies within Euclidean distance δ of the robust alternators, called the δ-
neighborhood of the robust alternators [4,23]. The constant term Z normalizes the probability of adopting
a strategy, so that ga + gc + gd = 1.
Similarly, the probability of the system adopting a robust self-cooperator is
gc = ZδVc
∫
p∈[0,1]4
∫
q∈Cr
ρ(p,q)dpdq,
and the probability of the system adopting a robust self-defector strategy
gd = ZδVd
∫
p∈[0,1]4
∫
q∈Dr
ρ(p,q)dpdq. (14)
Once at a robust strategy, we know that, under strong selection, the system evolves through neutral
invasion among strategies of the same type (C, D, or A). The probability h of leaving a strategy type is
therefore the probability that a randomly drawn memory-1 strategy replaces a randomly drawn resident
of that type. For the self-alternators we have
ha =
∫
q∈A
∫
p∈[0,1]4
ρ(q,p)dpdq
where q is integrated over all self-alternator strategies A. Similarly we have
hc =
∫
q∈C
∫
p∈[0,1]4
ρ(q,p)dpdq
for self-cooperators, where q is integrated over all self-cooperator strategies C. And
hd =
∫
q∈D
∫
p∈[0,1]4
ρ(q,p)dpdq (15)
for self-defectors, where q is integrated over all self-defector strategies D. The stationary distribution of
this three-state Markov chain with these transition probabilities can be readily found to give
Πa =
ga/ha
ga/ha + gc/hc + gd/hd
for the probability of the system to be at an self-alternator strategy,
Πc =
gc/hc
ga/ha + gc/hc + gd/hd
for the probability of the system to be at a self-cooperator strategy, and
Πd =
gd/hd
ga/ha + gc/hc + gd/hd
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for the probability of the system to be at a self-defector strategy.
As shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 4 of the main text, the analytic expressions above for the amount of time
spent at each strategy type, given the current payoff matrix, provide very good approximations for the
actual occupancy times observed in Monte-Carlo simulations over all strategies, even as the payoff matrix
evolves.
Relaxation of assumptions
We now relax each of four assumptions made in the main text: strong selection, rapid mutations to pay-
offs, “private” mutations to payoffs, and global mutations to strategies.
Necessary conditions for memory-1 strategies to be evolutionary robustness under weak
selection: We have so far assumed that selection is strong. However, we can relax this assumption, and
consider instead the robustness of memory-1 strategies in the regime of weak selection, N →∞ with Nσ
fixed, as in [23]. For a population evolving under strong selection, i.e. in the limit N → ∞ with fixed
σ, a strategy X is evolutionary robust iff sxx ≥ sxy for all Y , i.e if no mutant is selected to invade. For
a population evolving under weak selection, i.e. in the limit N → ∞ with Nσ fixed, even deleterious
mutants may reach high frequency due to genetic drift. Therefore, in order to find the strategies that
are evolutionary robust under weak selection, we must look at the probability of fixation, ρ(px,qy). In
particular, a strategy X is robust under weak selection iff ρ(px,qy) ≤ 1/N for all mutants Y , where 1/N
is the probability of neutral fixation. The expression for ρ(px,qy) under weak selection can be Taylor
expanded to give the following robustness condition: a strategy X is evolutionary robust iff
(N − 2)(syy − 2sxx + 2syx − sxy) > 3(sxy − syx) (16)
where N is the population size [5]. In this regime, we will first show that only the three strategy types, self-
alternators, self-cooperators and self-defectors, can potentially be robust, just as under strong selection.
We then further show that under weak selection a robust strategy must maximize the sum of a player’s
score and her opponent’s score – which implies that self-defectors are never robust under weak selection.
First we derive necessary conditions for robustness. Recall that, for a resident strategy X we can
write
sxx = κx − λx
1− χx (vcd + vdc)
for the payoff of X against itself and the payoff of a mutant Y against X is
syx =
(1− χx)κx − λx(wcd + wdc) + χx((1− χy)κy − λy(wcd + wdc))
(1− χxχy)
Similarly we have
syy = κy − λy
1− χy (v ∗cd +v∗dc)
for the payoff of Y against itself and the payoff of a mutant X against Y is
sxy =
(1− χy)κy − λy(wcd + wdc) + χy((1− χx)κx − λx(wcd + wdc))
(1− χxχy)
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consider, as before, a resident strategy with pcc < 1 and pdd > 0, along with a mutation that results in a
small change to κy = κx + η, and a small change to λy so that (1 − χx)κx − λx = (1 − χy)κy − λy. We
then have
syx = κx +
χxη
1 + χx
(1− (wcd + wdc))− λx
1− χx (wcd + wdc)
as well as
sxy = κx +
η
1 + χx
(1− (wcd + wdc))− λx
1− χx (wcd + wdc)
and
syy = κx + η(1− (v ∗cd +v∗dc))− λx
1− χx (v ∗cd +v∗dc)
Also note that (v ∗cd +v∗dc) − (vcd + vdc) = A∗η where A∗ is finite and is zero if pcd = 0 and pdc = 1 or
pcd = 1 and pdc = 0. We can then write
sxy − syx = η1− χx
1 + χx
(1− (vcd + vdc))
and
sxx − syx = Aη λx
1− χx − η
χx
1 + χx
(1− (vcd + vdc))
and
syy − sxy = η χx
1 + χx
(1− (vcd + vdc))− η λx
1− χx (A
∗ −A)
where terms O
(
η2
)
and greater have been neglected. Replacing these expressions into Eq. 16 gives
η(N − 2)
[
3
χx
1 + χx
(1− (vcd + vdc))− λx
1− χx (A
∗ +A)
]
> 3η
1− χx
1 + χx
(1− (vcd + vdc))
This can always be satisfied unless vcd + vdc = 1 and A
∗ +A = 0, which occurs iff pcd = 0 and pdc = 1 or
pcd = 1 and pdc = 0, i.e. if the resident is an self-alternating strategy.
Similarly, we can consider mutations that change λx by a small amount, for strategies with 0 < pcd < 1
and 0 < pdc < 1. The resulting payoffs following such a mutation are
sxx = κx − λx
1− χx (vcd + vdc)
for the payoff of X against itself and the payoff of a mutant Y against X is
syx = κx − λx
1− χx (wcd + wdc)− η
χx
1 + χ2x
(wcd + wdc)
Similarly we have
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syy = κx − λx
1− χx (v ∗cd +v∗dc)− η
1
1− χx (v ∗cd +v∗dc)
for the payoff of Y against itself and the payoff of a mutant X against Y is
sxy = κx − λx
1− χx (wcd + wdc)− η
1
1 + χ2x
(wcd + wdc)
We can then write
sxy − syx = −η 1
1 + χx
(vcd + vdc)
and
syy − sxy = η λx
1− χx (A−A
∗)− η χx
1 + χ2x
(vcd + vdc)
where in this case A∗ = 0 if pcc = 1 or if pdd = 0. We also have
sxx − syx = η λx
1− χxA+ η
χx
1 + χ2x
(vcd + vdc)
Replacing these expressions into Eq. 16 gives
η(N − 2)
[
λx
1− χx (A+A
∗) + 3
χx
1 + χ2x
(vcd + vdc)
]
< 3η
1
1 + χx
(vcd + vdc)
which can always be satisfied unless vcd + vdc = 0 and A + A
∗ = 0, which occurs iff pcc = 1 or pdd = 0,
i.e. if the resident strategy is either a self-cooperator or a self-defector.
Thus, in total, we have shown that only self-alternators, self-cooperators and self-defectors can be robust
under weak selection. However we can also construct a strategy that will selectively replace any resident
that does not achieve the maximum possible score against itself. To see this, consider a resident self-
alternator with pcd = 0 and pdc = 1, which scores sxx = (1/2)(R(cd) +R(dc)). If 2R(cc) > R(cd) +R(dc),
we can construct a mutant Y with pcd = 0, pdc = 1 and pcc = 1. Such a mutant scores syx = sxy = sxx.
However it also scores syy = (1/2)(R(cc) + sxx) (assuming that there is an error rate  in the player’s
execution of their strategy [25]). Therefore we have syy > sxx, which means that Y is selected to re-
place X, according to Eq. 16. A similar argument holds for any resident of the type self-alternator,
self-cooperator or self-defector, unless sxx is maximum. This implies that, in fact, under weak selection
only self-cooperators or self-alternators can be robust, since by definition self-defectors do not maximize
their scores.
Note that a memory-1 strategy that is robust under weak selection is robust against all opponents,
regardless of their memory. Although the robustness conditions under weak selection depend on syy, we
have shown that in order to be robust sxx must be maximized. As a result, no opponent can do better
against himself than a resident robust strategy does against herself.
The collapse of cooperation under weak selection: Sufficient conditions for a strategy to be robust
under weak selection can be found using Eqs. 5-10 along with Eq. 16. The case 2R(cc) > R(dc) +R(cd),
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for example, in which only a subset of self-cooperators are robust, has been studied by [23]. For the
donation game, these conditions reduce to
λ >
B − C
3N
[N + 1− (2N − 1)χ]
and
λ >
B + C
N − 2 [N + 1− (2N − 1)χ]
Using Eq. 1 to convert back to the standard coordinate system we have
[3N(B + C) + (2N − 1)(B − C)] (1− pab) > [3N(B + C)− (2N − 1)(B − C)] pba
and
2(N − 2)(B − C)(1− pab) > [3N(B + C)− (N − 2)(B − C)] pbb
Just as in the case of strong selection, the volume of robust self-cooperative strategies shrinks as the ratio
of benefits to costs shrinks. And so this analysis predicts a collapse of cooperation as payoffs evolve to-
wards higher values. This behavior is indeed confirmed by Monte-Carlo simulations (Fig. S7), illustrating
that the collapse of cooperation occurs under both strong and weak selection.
Alternate mutation schemes: We have focused in the main text on a mutation scheme in which
γ = 1.25, so that costs and benefits occur in the relationship B = 1.25C + k. The collapse of cooperation
persists, to a lesser or greater extent, when larger or smaller values of γ > 1 are considered, as shown in
Fig. S3a-c. These payoff-mutation schemes all correpond to a tradeoff in which larger benefits of mutual
cooperation, B − C, are associated with larger costs of being defected against, C.
We can alterantively consider values 0 < γ < 1. In this case, as B and C increase, the benefit
for mutual cooperation, B − C, decreases. And so larger benefits of mutual cooperation are no longer
associated with larger costs of being defected against. When strategies and payoffs co-evolve under this
mutation scheme selection leads to decreasing values of B and C, until C reaches zero (so that there is
no longer a Prisoner’s Dilemma). As might be expected, there is a collapse of defection in this case, with
self-defectors replaced by self-cooperators as payoffs evolve (Fig. S4).
Finally, in the limiting case in which B can increase indefinitely and C remains fixed, self-cooperators
become more successful as B evolves and there is no collapse of cooperation (Fig. S3d).
Public mutations to payoffs: We have assumed that mutations to payoffs affect only the individ-
ual carrying the mutation – so called “private” mutations. This assumption can be relaxed in a number
of ways, to reflect the fact that a social interaction is occurring. One natural alternative is to assume that
each player sets their opponent’s costs or benefits. In the first case, when players set their opponent’s
cost C, the payoffs received by player X facing opponent Y are Rx(cc) = Bx − Cy, Rx(cd) = −Cy,
Rx(dc) = Bx and Rx(dd) = 0. Under this payoff mutation scheme we again find that higher payoffs
evolve, precipitating the collapse of cooperation (Fig. S5). However, in the second case, when players set
their opponent’s benefits B, the payoffs received by player X facing opponent Y are Rx(cc) = By − Cx,
Rx(cd) = −Cx, Rx(dc) = By and Rx(dd) = 0, and we find evolution towards increased self-cooperation,
despite decreasing rewards for mutual cooperation, B − C (Fig. S6).
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Slow mutations to payoffs: In the main text we assumed that mutations to payoffs and mutations
to strategies occur at equal rates. This assumption can be relaxed to allow for the scenario in which
mutations to payoffs are relatively more rare. As shown in Fig. S8 the collapse of cooperation persists
even when mutations to payoffs are relatively rare.
Local mutations to strategies: In the main text we assumed that mutations to strategies are global,
such that a mutant was drawn uniformally from the space of all memory-1 strategies. This assumption
can be altered to consider the scenario in which mutations to strategies increase or decrease each element
of a memory-1 strategy, p, by a small amount ∆, with the constraint that mutant probabilities lie in the
range [0, 1]. As shown in Fig. S9 the collapse of cooperation persists when mutations to strategies are
local.
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Figure S1 – Confirmation by Monte-Carlo simulation of analytical conditions for evolutionary robustness of strate-
gies. For each of the three strategy types, self-cooperators (pcc = 1), self-defectors (pdd = 0), and self-alternators
(pcd = 0 and pdc = 1), we compare analytic expression for evolutionary robustness (black lines) with numerical
calculations of robustness (light blue regions). Coordinates (κ, χ) for the self-alternating strategies and (λ, χ) for
self-cooperators and self-defectors were sampled in regular intervals of 0.01 within the space of all feasible strategies
(outlined in red). For each sampled pair of co-ordinates (λ, χ) we also sampled 103 associated values of φ, ranging
from φ→ 0 to the maximum feasible φ. To determine numerically whether a focal strategy X = (λ, χ, φ) is robust
we computed the longterm payoffs sxx, syy, sxy and syx against 10
6 opponent strategies, Y , drawn uniformly from
all memory-1 strategies. A focal strategy X was designated as robust if no strategy Y was found with a score
syx > sxx. Parameters are N = 100, σ = 10, R(cc) = R = 3, R(cd) = S = 0, R(dc) = T = 5 and R(dd) = P = 1.
23
Self%&
Cooperate&
Self%
Defect&
Self%
Alternate&
gdha 
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Figure S2 – A simplified, three-state Markov chain to describe evolution of strategies in two-player games. The
transition rates are as given by Eqs. 14-15. In this simplified model we assume that the time spent away from
these three strategy types can be neglected. This approximation is supported by simulations on the full space of
strategies, which indicate that such populations occupy one of these three strategy types > 97% of the time.
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Figure S3 – The collapse of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma under different mutation schemes. We simulated
populations under weak mutation, proposing both mutant strategies and mutant payoffs at equal rates, µ/2. Mu-
tations to strategies were drawn uniformly from the full space of memory-1 strategies. Mutations to payoffs were
drawn so that increasing benefits of cooperation incur increasing costs: mutations perturbing the benefit B by ∆
were drawn uniformly from the range ∆ ∈ [−0.1, 0.1], with the corresponding change to cost C chosen to enforce
the relationship B = γC + k with (a) γ = 1.5, (b) γ = 1.75, (c) γ = 2.0 or (d) allowing B to evolve with fixed
C = 1. Evolution was modelled according to an imitation process under weak mutation [4,23,26]. Self-cooperative
strategies are initially robust and dominate the population, but they are quickly replaced by self-defectors as payoffs
evolve. Dots indicate the proportion of 105 replicate populations, at each time point, within distance δ = 0.01 of
the three strategy types self-cooperate, self-defect, and self-alternate. Lines indicate analytic predictions for the
frequencies of these strategy types, which depend upon the corresponding volumes of robust strategies. Simulations
were run until each population experienced 5 × 105 mutations. Populations of size N = 100 were initiated with
B = 3 and C = 1, and evolved under selection strength σ = 1 (strong selection).
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Figure S4 – Co-evolution of strategies and payoffs when B and C are allowed to evolve with γ = 0.75, so that the
payoff for mutual cooperation, B−C, increases as B and C decrease. (a) Populations were initialized at B = 6 and
C = 5, under which self-defect dominates. Once strategies and payoffs start to co-evolve, self-cooperate begins to
increase and eventually comes to dominate. (b) Benefits B and costs C evolve towards lower values. We simulated
populations under weak mutation as in Fig. 2a. Lines indicate analytic predictions for the frequencies of these
strategy types, which depend upon the corresponding volumes of robust strategies. Simulations were run until each
population had experienced 5× 105 mutations. Populations of size N = 100 were initiated with B = 3 and C = 1,
and evolved under selection strength σ = 1 (strong selection).
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Figure S5 – Public mutation and the collapse of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. We simulated populations
under weak mutation, as in Fig. 2a, except that mutations to C are “public” in the sense that the cost of an
interaction borne by a player depends on the genotype of her opponent, as described in the supplementary text.
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Figure S6 – Public mutation and the collapse of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. (a) We simulated popu-
lations under weak mutation, as in Fig. 2a, except that mutations to B are “public” in the sense that the benefit
of recieved by a player depends on the genotype of her opponent, as described in the supplementary text. In this
case populations evolve away from self-defect and towards self-cooperate. However (b) this evolution comes at the
expense of decreasing benefits for cooperation.
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Figure S7 – The collapse of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma under weak selection. We simulated populations
under weak mutation as in Fig. 2a, except with N = 100 and σ = 0.01 (weak selection). Self-cooperative strategies
are initially robust and dominate the population, but they are quickly replaced by self-defectors as payoffs evolve.
29
0.0
0.5
1.0
E
ns
em
bl
e 
m
ea
n 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
st
ra
te
gy
self-cooperate
self-defect
self-alternate
0
Time (units of 1/μ)
3x106 6x106
strategy 
evolution
strategy and 
payoff co-evolution
Figure S8 – Slow mutations to payoffs and the collapse of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. We simulated
populations under weak mutation as in Fig. 2a, except that mutations altering strategies occur at 103-times the
rate of mutations altering payoffs. Self-cooperative strategies are initially robust and dominate the population, but
they are quickly replaced by self-defectors as payoffs evolve.
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Figure S9 – Local mutations to payoffs and the collapse of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. We simulated
populations under weak mutation as in Fig. 2a, except that mutations altering strategies are now “local” so that
mutations perturbing each of the four probabilities (pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd by an amount ∆ were drawn uniformly from
the range ∆ ∈ [−0.01, 0.01]. Self-cooperating strategies are initially robust and dominate the population, but they
are quickly replaced by self-defectors as payoffs evolve.
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